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NULLITY OF MARRIAGE FOR FRAUD
Applications for nullity of marriage for fraud present so
infinite a variety of circumstances, that a clear conception and
definite recognition of the quintessence of the policy which in-
duces courts to annul for this reason, are desirable.
Fraud has been aptly termed by Lord Stair, hydra mul-
torum capitum. In determining its existence in this type of case,
the courts are presented with willful representation, conscious
concealment, statements of half truths, honest belief of things
actually false, and in general with all of the diverse elements
which go to make up a suppression of the truth or a suggestion
of that which is not true. Suits of this class present the alleged
fraud in connection with a multitude of subjects; among them,
insanity, tuberculosis, epilepsy, foul disease, antenuptial incon-
tinence, religious belief, social and financial worth, heredity, and
many others. These, in almost endless combinations and permu-
tations with the indicia of fraud referred to, have resulted in
a mass of decisions in which the influence of a given element
appears to be somewhat dependent upon the existence or degree
of prominence of some other element.
But these are not the most compelling factors requiring
careful scrutiny to discover the rationale of the cases. There
has been a greater appreciation in more recent years of a dis-
tinction between consummated and unconsummated marriage,
in respect to the nature and degree of fraud which should be
required to move a court to grant its decree of nullity. This
has resulted in the statement of doctrines which previously were
frowned upon or passed over without serious consideration.
Their extension or delimitation demands much attention.
Furthermore, considerations of public policy and communal
morality have had much to do with the shaping of the accepted
tenets on this subject. They arose from the needs and conditions
of an era ending two or more generations in the past, and thence
stretching backwards many more. In the interim, there has
grown up an extensive legislative establishment of individual
privileges and disabilities bearing directly or indirectly upon
the marital relation. Add to this the advent of a much altered
way of life, and it is plain that there is considerable need for a
searching analysis of the composition of social and juridical con-
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cepts constituting the formula, so to speak, of nullity of mar-
riage for fraud. Thus it can be ascertained whether it requires
re-statement or whether its soundness continues, either upon old
or upon new sanctions.
The mutuality and reality of consent necessary to effect a
marriage, which fraud tends to destroy or prevent, was formerly
searched for no further than the external manifestations of a
meeting of the minds, and was regarded in some of the early
cases as being the alpha and omega of inquiry. Lord Stowell
expressed one view held on this subject in the following
language: "Suppose a young man of sixteen, in the first bloom
of youth, the representative of a noble family, and the inheritor
of a splendid fortune; suppose that he is induced by persons
connected with a female in all respects unworthy of such an
alliance, to contract a marriage with her, after due publication
of banns in a parish church, to which both are strangers-I say
the strongest case you could establish, of the most deliberate
plot, leading to a marriage the most unseemly in all dispropor-
tions of rank, of fortune, of habits of life, and even of age itself,
would not enable this coourt to release him from chains which,
though forged by others, he had riveted on himself. If he is
capable of consent, and has consented, the law does not ask how
the consent has been induced. His own consent, however pro-
cured, is his own act, and he must impute all the consequences
resulting from it, either to himself or to others whose happiness
he ought to have consulted, to his own responsibility for that
consent. The law looks no further back.','
In the much quoted case of Wakefield v. McKay,2 the same
jurist said: "A man who means to act upon such representa-
tions should verify them by his own inquiries. The law presumes
that he used due caution in a matter in which his happiness for
life is so materially involved, and it makes no provision for the
relief of a blind credulity, however it may have been produced."
While there were authorities which placed denial of relief
upon a conception of consent ascribing to it an all sufficient
character, others chose to rest the same conclusions in connec-
tion with fraudulent representations respecting character, for-
tune, health or the like, upon the ground that these related to
' ,Jzivan v. ,gunvan, 2 Hag. (Con.) 238.
21 Phillim, 134.
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accidental matters, not going to the essentials of the marital
relation. In doing so, they were not without precedents. The
ecclesiastical courts distinguished between "error substantialis,"
and "error accidentalis." The former was of such a nature as
reached the essence of the consent of the parties; the latter em-
braced accidental frauds, which did not affect the capacity of
the parties to contract or to perform the duties imposed by the
marital relationship, and which did not serve to destroy the
essence of consent.3
Judicial opinion as to what constitutes an essential of mar-
riage has been for a long time undergoing a change. In the
earliest American cases, it was considered that the parties to
the union were bound to place their affections where they had
promised, and not upon some attribute then regarded in the
nature of a personal adornment, or a desirable, but not essential
attribute. This was thought to follow from the undertaking of
the parties to take each other for better or worse, in sickness
and in health.
What was deemed non-essential to the comparatively simple
living conditions of half a century ago, may well be of utmost
importance today. The more recent cases indicate that the
courts have translated this idea into action.
To judge rightly the trend of present day holdings in
determing whether they are consistent with, or desirable de-
partures from older precendents, we must first discard certain
reasoning found in these cases which have had so much influence
upon the development of this branch of the law. This reason-
ing has erroneously been widely considered as the ratio decidendi.
An illustrative example is found in a comparison of the
views held on two subject matters commonly presented, ante-
nuptial incontinence and ante-nuptial pregnancy. In fact the
early conceptions on these subjects present not only an apt
illustration, but also the source of the largest part of the mis-
conceptions found in later cases.
It was quite uniformly held that fraud in connection with
ante-nuptial incontinence did not present a cause for nullity.
This, even though the woman was found to be a common prosti-
tute representing herself to be a virgin.
4
3 Ayliffe Parer, 362.
'Hedden v. Hedcen, 21 N. . E. 61 (1870); Smith v. Smith, 8 Or,
100 (1879Y; Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 8 N. W. 739 (1881).
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Respecting concealed pregnancy, however, where the peti-
tioner was free from illicit relations with his wife prior to their
marriage, it was held that this was sufficient to warrant a decree. 5
In the monumental Reynolds case Chief Justice Bigelow
said respecting incontinence: "Nothing can then avoid it which
does not amount to a fraud in the essentiia of the marriage
relation. And if mere incontinence in a woman prior to her
entrance into the marriage contract, not resulting in pregnancy,
does not necessarily prevent her from being a faithful wife, or
from bearing to her husband the pure offspring of his loins,
there seems to be no sufficient reason for holding misrepresenta-
tion or concealment on the subject of chastity to be such a fraud
as to afford a valid ground for declaring a consummated mar-
riage void."
Turning to the other subject he proceeded to differentiate
it: "The latter, (incontinence) relates only to her conduct and
character prior to the contract, while the former, (pregnancy)
touches directly her actual present condition and her fitness to
execute the marriage contract, and take on herself the duties of
a chaste and faithful wife. It is not going too far to say that a
woman who has not only submitted to the embraces of another
man, but who also bears in her womb the fruit of such illicit
intercourse, has, during the period of her gestation, incapacitated
herself from making and executing a valid contract of marriage
with a man who takes her as his wife in ignorance of her condi-
tion and on the faith of representations that she is chaste and
virtuous. "
The opinion proceeds to reason further: "A husband has
a right to require that his wife shall not bear to his bed aliens
to his blood and lineage. This is implied in the very nature
of the contract of marriage. . . . The rule of the common
law is, that if a man marry a woman who is with child, it raises
a presumption that the child with which she is pregnant was
begotten by him. This presumption is founded on the supposed
acknowledgment of paternity by the subsequent act of marriage;
and, although such presumption is liable to be rebutted, yet in
the absence of proof it stands. A man, therefore, who has con-
3BeynolZs v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 605 (Mass.) (1862); Uarris v.
Garris, 24 N. J. E. 516 (1875); Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87 (1859); Bitter
v. Ritter, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 81 (1839) May v. May, 71 Kan. 317; 80 Pac.
567 (1905); Harrel v. Harrell, 42 S. W. (Tex.) 1040 (1897).
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tracted a marriage with a woman under such circumstances, if
he could not obtain a divorce on the ground of fraud, would be
subjected to the painful alternative of disowning the child, and
thereby publishing to the world the shame of her who was still
to remain his wife, or suffer the presumption of legitimacy to
stand, and admit the child of another to share in his bounty
and receive support in like manner as his own legitimate
children. There is no sound rule of law or consideration of
policy which requires that a marriage procured by false state-
ments or representations and attended with such results upon
an innocent party, should be held valid and binding on him."
Now, examining the first reason given for the Reynolds
decision, it is obvious that the condition of the woman is not
complete and incurable impotence. It is a temporary incapacity
to bear children. With the birth of the child then in the
mother's womb, the inability to fulfill all wifely functions is
entirely removed. The parties have taken each other for a
lifetime. Surely the law must regard as unsubstantial the short
space of time during which the wife is incapacitated from bear-
ing offspring to her husband. If this were all, it would not be
sufficient if consistency with the holding in the case of mere
antenuptial incontinence is to be maintained.
There is more weight to the second reason given, namely,
that it is the right of a husband to require that his wife shall
not bear aliens to his blood. Regarding the fraud and its results
in this light, it is of a nature as stated in Carris v. Carris, supra
S..either compelling the husband to disown the child for
his protection, or imposing upon him the necessity of recognizing
and maintaining the fruit of his wife's defilement by another,
and having it partake of his inheritance. In either event, shame
and entire alienation are the inevitable consequences." In this
case, the court, it is evident from the opinion, chose to rest its
decision largely upon the last discussed consideration.
In many jurisdictions propagation has come to be regarded
as the principal object to be accomplished by marriage. This
policy has been largely due to a failure to extract from the
earliest precedents, the pith and heart of their reasoning-tlie
social and moral concepts which prompted the written word.
The Reynolds case has been followed and cited perhaps more
than any other decision on this subject. In resting decisions
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upon it, courts have declared it to establish propagation as the
prime requisite of the relationship. This is not so. From the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion, it is evident that the reaZ
motivating force which prompted the conclusions arrived at,
consisted, not in a conception that complete and perfect ability
to propagate issue was the quintessence of marriage, but rather
is indicated to have been a recognition that that is essential
to marriage which is necessary to enable the parties to live a
married life. Just that-to live through a lifetime as husband
and wife, a union marked ,by (a) the general presence of the
ability to procreate, and (b) the absence of those factors, which
would permanently destroy that ability, either directly or by
some indirect means which would necessitate for the most
weighty of reasons, an alienation of husband and wife.
It cannot then be said that there is no precedent, if pre-
cedent there must be, for the granting of a decree of nullity upon
grounds, disconnected with propagation, which render it im-
possible for the union to continue. The "shame and entire
alienation" brought about by the birth of an illegitimate child,
regarded in the Carris decision as the matter of utmost impor-
tance, may be produced by other means and with just as total
and complete effect. It is not going beyond the plain purport of
these monumental cases to grant a decree for any reason which
produces such a condition.
The trend of modern decisions seems to indicate that the
seed of this idea has been widely sown and is burgeoning forth
with varying progress. In Davis v. Davis,6 a New Jersey case
which has been much quoted and cited, a decree was granted for
fraud consisting of the concealment of chronic hereditary tuber-
culosis, following the leading case of Sobel v. Sobet, 7 and in
doing so, the court in effect repudiated the dictum in an older
decision s which read: "Misrepresentation as to freedom from
disease in general or concealment of the existence of a disease,
although one in common apprehension communicable and trans-
missible to offspring, cannot, in my judgment, be so regarded.
They fall within the line of false representations as to family,
fortune or external condition, declared . . to be insufficient
0 90 N. J. E. 158 (1919).
"150 N. Y. Supp. 248 (1914).8 Crane v. Crane, 62 N. T. E. 21 (1901).
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to justify the annulment of marriage. As to such and like mat-
ters the parties take each other for better or for worse."
Decrees are now granted, in many cases with the effect of
overruling an older local precedent, for fraud in connection with
insanity or diseased mental condition, 9 epilepsy,10 syphilis or
other venereal disease," among many other subjects. While
these conditions have or may produce an injurious effect upon
issue, other recognized grounds for relief have no such circum-
stance present. In Truiano v. Truiano12 the defendant husband
represented that he was a United States citizen. He was not,
and as a consequence the petitioner was expatriated under the
federal statute in force at the time. The court found as a fact
that the fraud went to the essence of the marriage contract,
considering not only the proper pride of the petitioner in her
citizenship, but also the necessity of that citizenship to the
pursuit of her profession of school teacher in the State of New
York.
In another New York case,13 the petitioner married her
husband upon the strength of his representation that he was not
addicted to the use of drugs or narcotics or stimulants. In fact
the defendant was a confirmed user of heroin and cocaine and
OKeyes v. Keyes, 22 N. H. 523 (1851); Gross v. Gross, 96 Mo. Ap-
peals, 486, 70 S. W. 393 (1902); Hempel v. Hempel, 174 Mis. 332; 181
N. W. 749; 183 N. W. 258 (1921); Smith v. Smith, 112 Misc. 371; 184
N. Y. Supp. 134 (1920). Other courts have come to-an opposite con-
clusion. Hamaker v. Hamaker, 18 Ill. 138; 65 Am. Dee. 705 (1856);
Cummbigton v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223 (1889); Cf. Brainen v.
Brainen, 79 N. J. E. 270 (1912) and Buechler v. Simon, 146 Atl. (N. J.)
420 (1929). In the preceding case, it was stated: "An affliction of the
nervous system, of hereditary influence, predisposing to insanity, is not
itself a fraud and ground for annulling a marriage, ('unless' as ob-
served in one of the cases, 'the law guarantees to every husband a
rational mental standard for the mind of a wife.' To propound as a
doctrine of law that it is a fraud would render vulnerable every mar-
riage to a spouse inheriting a frail nervous system of the maniac
depressive type, and the number is not inconsiderable, or one of
potential paretic inheritance to the fourth generation of syphilitic
Infection or one the subject of any other heritable disorder that may
eventually lead to insanity. Such departure from accepted principles
governing the marriage relation Is for legislative, not judicial con-
sideration."
11 Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242 (1904); McGill v. McGill 163 N.
Y. Supp. 462 (1917); Gruber v. Gruber, 98 N. J. E. (1925).
nI rane v. Crane, supra. Meyer v. Meyer, 49 How. Pr. 311 (1875);
gvenson v. Svenson, 178 N. Y. 54; C- v. C -, 158 Wis. 301;
Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158 (1894); 28 Atl. 1029 (1894).
22121 MIsc. 635; 205 N. Y. Supp. 573 (1923).
" O'Connel v. O'Connell, 201 App. Div. 338, 194 N. Y. Supp. 265
(1922).
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had been placed in institutions prior to the marriage in attempts
to cure him. It further appeared that he was dishonorably dis-
charged from the United States Army because of such practises.
One child was born of the marriage. In granting a decree, the
court said: "It would be a cruel injustice to compel the plain-
tiff to go through life bound by ties of marriage to a dope fiend
past all hope of redemption, where it so clearly appears that
she was induced to contract such alliance by fraud aud deceit."
The principle thought which runs through the opinion seems
-to be that the marriage was induced by fraud and its contin-
uance would be an injustice. The authorities cited dwell upon
the plain proposition that it is proper to apply the rule that
had the fraud not been practised, the contract would not have
been made.
A Minnesota court1 4 has held that a decree should be
granted upon a showing that the defendant concealed from her
husband, the petitioner, that she had lived for many years as
the wife of a man whose lawful wife was still living. Upon the
death of the petitioner's former wife, the defendant by falsely
representing that she had secured a divorce from the man with
whom she had been living, induced the petitioner to marry her,
evidently for the sole purpose of obtaining a share in his prop-
erty.1 5 These few decisions are illustrative examples of many
others.
But it is not merely the causes for which decrees are now
given which indicate a broader conception of the essentials of
marriage. The opinions of some progressive courts point clearly
to a disposition to consider the question, "what is an essential
of marriage?" in the light of modern, social and even economic
conditions. In Domschke v. Domschke,' 6 a decree was granted
to a husband who was told by his wife, upon his inquiry, that
she had been the wife of a man then deceased, and that the
deceased was the father of her child, when in truth she had
been his mistress, and the child was illegitimate. The court in
effect found that although the want of chastity does not go to
the essentials of the marriage, chastity, if insisted upon, may
14Wemple v. Wemple, 170 Minn. 305; 212 N. W. 808 (1927).
"Accord. Roth v. Both, 97 Misc. 136, 161 N. Y. Supp. 99 (1916);
Contra. Donelly v. Strong, 175 Mass. 157; 55 N. E. 892 (1900); Boes
v. Hanger, 69 N. J. E. 10; 59 AtI. 904 (1905); Clark v. Clarke, 11 Abb.
Pr. (N. Y.) 228 (1860).
" 138 App. Div. 454; 122 N. Y. Supp. 892, (1910).
NULLITY OF M.ARRIAGE
be made an essential qualification. In doing so, it stated a very
broad and generic doctrine in the following language: "A man
is not presumed to contract for marriage simply upon the basis
of physical ability of the woman for cohabitation; for consortium
implies much more." The decision was rested upon the New
York case of Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, which will presently be
considered the opinion concentrating the holdings in that cause
in the following statement: "Thus we have the principle enun-
ciated that the materiality goes to the consent of the contract,
and need not strike at the capacity to make the contract and
to perform it."
It is significant to note that the decree was granted to par-
ties who cohabited for six years subsequent to their marriage.
In the somewhat recent New York case of Weill v. Weill,17
this doctrine was reiterated in the course of an opinion by which
a decree was granted for the fraudulent suppression of the fact
that the defendant had previously been married.
In a Minnesota case,' s although the court denied a decree
for fraud in connection with past insanity which recurred after
marriage and birth of issue, it was said: "In order to constitute
such fraud there must be something that destroys the consent,
which blots out all semblance of contract, or it must impose at
the time of marriage, upon the one wronged, burdens and
obstacles wholly unexpected, and of such character that they
tend to the destruction of domestic happiness and promote
humiliation, disclosing a situation intolerable to society and
detrimental to the marriage relation."
A New Hampshire court has gone to the length of holding,
in a case where the marriage was consummated, that a decree
will be granted upon grounds which do not penetrate to the
essentials of marriage as long as the fraud is material and
prevents a substantial meeting of the minds. 19
21 104 Misc. 561, 172 N. Y. Supp. 589 (1918).
13Robertson v. Roth, 204 N. W. 329 (1925).1' Gatto v. Gatto, 106 Ati. 493 (1919). "That the fraud on account
of which the marriage will be set aside must relate to a matter material
to the marriage relation which the defrauded party could not, in the
exercise of reasonable prudence, discover at the time, and the effect of
which he has not waived when fully informed of it, is a principle
readily deducible from many American authorities. It is not exclu-
sively confined to the essentialla of the marriage relation as defined
in the Reynolds case."
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The opinion in Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo,19A establishes a
view that consent is to be searched for as the essence of mar-
riage. The Court of Appeals reversed the act of the Appellate
Division of the Supreme Court in denying a decree of nullity
upon a showing by the plaintiff that he married the defendant
upon her false representations that she had given birth to a
child of which he was the father, when in fact no such child
was ever born.
Justice Gray said for the court: "While, then, it is true,
that marriage contracts are based upon considerations peculiar
to themselves, and that public policy is concerned with the regu-
lation of the family relation, nevertheless our law considers
marriage in no other light than as a civil contract. Kujek v.
Goldman, 150 N. Y. 176, 34 L. R. A. 156, 44 N. E. 773. The
free and full consent which is of the essence of all ordinary con-
tracts is expressly made by the statute necessary to the validity
of the marriage contract. The minds of the parties must meet
in one intention .......
"In this case the representation of the defendant was as
to a fact, except for the truth of which the necessary consent
of the plaintiff would not have been obtained to the marriage.
It was designed to create a state of mind in the plaintiff, the
operation of which would be to yield a consent to marry the
defendant in the belief that he was rectifying a great wrong.
The minds of the parties did not meet upon a common basis of
operation .....
"If the plaintiff proves to the satisfaction of the court that
through misrepresentation of some fact which was an essential
element in the giving of his consent to the contract of marriage,
and which was of such a nature as to deceive an ordinarily
prudent person, he has been victimized, the court is empowered
to annul the marriage."' 20
-A 174 N. Y. 467, 67 N. E. 63 (1903).
20 The Court construed Code Civ. Proc. section 1743, sub-division 4,
which confers a general jurisdiction to' render a decree nullifying a
marriage where "the consent of one of the parties was obtained by
force, duress or fraud." Referring to this language, the opinion
states: "This language is broad, and warrants but the one reasonable
construction that the fraud must be material to that degree that, had
it not been practised, the party deceived would not have consented to
the marriage." Cf. Blank v. Blank, 107 N. Y. 91, 13 N. E. 615 (1887).
For a view opposed to that of the Di Lorenzo case on the facts, see
Hoffman v. Hoffman, 30 Pa. 417. (1858),
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These more recent views are undoubtedly the result of a
determination of the controversy at hand by minds cognizant
of the demands of present day living conditions. The question
arises: Are they warranted?
Any departure from established principles in a matter
which is permeated with considerations of public policy, neces-
sarily must be considered and made with much circumspection.
In endeavoring to advance pari passa -with conditions of living,
it must be recognized that the considerations of policy concerned
are in large measure directed to bring about and protect a great
institution, the home.
During recent years a new and ever growing burden has
been placed upon the home. A social metamorphosis has taken
place which requires that courts cast new weights for use in the
scales in which are weighed the various elements making up the
complicated formula to which this type of suit may be likened.
The home never was, of course, a mere place to sleep and
eat. It was in fact as well as in popular esteem the greatest
single builder of those human traits which make for honest and
moral living. A rapidly advancing civilization has now placed
upon the home a greater obligation than it ever had in those
respects. The same can be said of its role as the breeding place
of culture, and accomplishment of an economic and practical
nature.
The reason exists all about us. Ours is a highly complex
mode of life. It is marked by the constant creation of new, and
the enlargement of existing obligations, between individuals in
all manner of relationships. One of its prominent characteristics
has been the creation of ways of life which substituted new
values for old. The family as a unit is suffering from the effect
of outside forces and interests which tend to divert attention
from it and weaken the bonds which hold it together. All of
this demands, in a greater degree than ever before, a complete-
ness and soundness in home life. Increased demands upon the
soil require increased cultivation and fertilization. Increased
demands upon the home, and thus upon the marital relationship,
require greater strength for it, greater respect from those re-
garding it objectively, and more of the ability and will to co-
operate in the performance of new duties from those embraced
within it. Obviously, a policy which recognizes as a ground
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for nullity that which militates against such a type of home life
will be productive of good.
At the same time we must remember that the earliest cases,
in requiring a showing of extreme fraud going to the essence of
marriage which did not have the effect of avoiding it against
sound considerations of public policy, went still further and
took great care that no violence was done to sound morality.
The question of morality then uppermost in the minds of the
courts was the fact that the nullity of a marriage where children
were born had the effect of bastardizing the issue. In most
states, it is now provided by statute, that the annulment of a
marriage for fraud shall not render the issue illegitimate. But
this does not mean that the question of moraliy is no longer
important. On the contrary it is very prominently present.
Even when the question of morality had to do primarily with
the status of children, it was also concerned with the setting
of an example, not only to the interested litigants, but to the
community at large as well, that a system would not be tolerated
where the fruits of marriage might be enjoyed promiscuously
and the formal relationship which permitted such enjoyment,
could be readily dissolved for frauds of minor import. This
need certainly exists today. As has already been indicated, the
demands of our contemporary modes of life, economic and social,
tending as they do, to weaken the fabric of home life, and pre-
venting in many cases the very intermingly of the warp and
woof of that fabric, sound considerations of morality require
the denial of a plea for nullity rested upon frauds where the
complete picture presented by the application is one which
ostensibly will have an unwholesome effect as an example of
sanctioned communal morality.
None of this is inconsistent with the inclination of courts
to decree the nullity of unconsummated marriages for frauds
which do not cut as deeply as the ones which were heretofore
commonly regarded as being requisite. The mere speaking of
words by the parties to the marriage, and the performance of
certain acts by a person authorized to perform a marriage cere-
mony, do not have a mystic or catalytic effect of themselves.
It is the subsequent relationship which is the result of the
voluntary act of the parties which produces a status, If, im-
mediately upon the conclusion of the ceremony of marriage, or
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shortly thereafter and before cohabitation, the parties should
separate, their condition is not so materially altered by the cele-
bration of the marriage rites, as to require the application of
the same principles which are dictated in a case where they live
together as husband and wife and perhaps establish a home and
bring children into the world.
The earlier cases indicate that most courts were entirely
without any conception of a possible distinction between a con-
summated and an unconsummated marriage. For example, in
the Iowa case of Wier v. Still,21 the petitioner's testimony was
that the defendant, a stranger, came to petitioner's house and
represented to her that she had been recommended to him by
friends and acquaintances, as a suitable person for a wife. In
response to her refusal to have him visit her further, he said that
he was a man of good character, and of good social standing
with respectable relations and connections. In a day or two
he again called and made the same representations and added
that he had plenty of means and would maintain the petitioner
and educate her child. Several days later he called with a mar-
riage license and went with petitioner to her mother's house
where he again repeated the representations. A Justice of the
Peace was sent for and a marriage ceremony performed. The
parties started to the petitioner's residence. Upon arriving,
she told the defendant to leave because she felt badly about the
transaction. He returned in a day or two. During this time
the petitioner learned something of his true character and re-
fused him admittance. It transpired that the defendant had
served three terms in a penitentiary in Iowa. The Supreme
Court, in sustaining the action of the District Court, dismissed
the petition without discussing the want of consummation and
rested its decision upon the ground that nullity would not be
decreed where the representations related to condition, rank,
fortune or character.
An Illinois Court, however, 22 rendered a decree of nullity
where it appeared that petitioner was a young school girl ap-
proximately fifteen years old who was inveigled into a marriage
with the defendant who was employed as her father's coachman.
He procured a marriage license through perjury by swearing
231 Iowa 107 (1870).
2Lyndon v. Lyndon, 69 Ill. 43 (1873).
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that petitioner was of age. Immediately after the performance
of the ceremony the petitioner repentant of her folly, returned
to her parents, repudiating the entire affair.
In an early Texas case, 2 3 a decree was granted where the
marriage was unconsummated and the only fraud consisted in
representations to the petitioner, who was less than eighteen
years old, that her parents would consent to the marriage. These
representations were made during a fishing excursion upon
which the petitioner was decoyed. A marriage license was pro-
cured by the defendant by falsely swearing that the petitioner
was more than eighteen years of age.
Such cases as these two, however, were exceptional. The
element of non-consummation never entered into the considera-
tion of many cases which presented similar fact situations where
decrees were denied.
The modern view is indicated in Brown v. Scott,24 it ap-
peared that the petitioner, then eighteen years of age and attend-
ing school was introduced to the defendant. He was engaging
in conversation and in manners. He posed as a wounded hero
of the Great War and appeared, according to the testimony, to
be very attractive. The petitioner seemed to be taken with his
physical appearance, with the air of romance presented by his
reputation as a lieutenant in the war, and with his remarkable
conversational powers. He represented that he was in receipt
of a salary of $5,000 a year as an operative of the government
secret service, in addition to other income. In less than a month
after their introduction, the petitioner eloped with him and
upon their marriage she returned home and to school. About
two months thereafter, the petitioner's father having learned
of the marriage, caused the defendant's arrest under a charge
of impersonating a federal officer, and he was later convicted.
He confessed that his representations were untrue. An investi-
gation disclosed that he was an ex-convict, having led a life of
crime since his boyhood. Although the Circuit Court dismissed
the bill, the Court of Appeals reversed its action and ordered
a decree of nullity.25
'Robertson v. Cole, 12 Tex. 356 (1854).
24117 Atl. 114 (Md. 1922).
21 "To approve and sanction a fraud so gross and destructive, and
to condemn this school girl to live out her life bound by the ties of
marriage in an alliance so degrading, would be revolting to the corn-
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In another Maryland case,26 a decree was granted for mis-
representations among others, that the defendant was of good
character, whereas in fact he was of loose and immoral habits,
and associated with immoral women.27
The subject has received elaborate consideration in New
Jersey. In Ysern v. Horter,28 the rationale of the cases was
summed up as follows: "So far as the question has been dis-
cussed in reported American cases in other jurisdictions and by
the text-writers, I find substantial agreement to the effect that
an unconsummated marriage is little more than an engagement
to marry-that there is no reason based on public policy why,
for instance, a young girl should be tied forever to an escaped
criminal simply because of a ceremony of marriage to which
she was induced by a fraudulent representation by her spouse
that he was a person of good character, respectable standing in
society and in large fortune.
"Mly conclusion on the whole case, is, that it is unnecessary
to determine whether the defendant's fraud related to a 'com-
mon law essential' of the marriage. I know of no authority for
the proposition that such an inquiry must be made except in
cases where the marriage has been consummated, and in the
leading case (Ca;'ris v. Carris) in which such inquiry was ad-
judged necessary, not only had the marriage been consummated,
but a child had been born whom a decree of nullity would bas-
tardize. It would be rash for me to undertake-unnecessarily,
I think, for the purpose of this case-to define a term of some-
what vague import which so far has been left undefined. If
the common law 'essentials' of a marriage consist exclusively
of marital intercourse, and the incidents which usually follow,
such as the establishment of a home and the birth of children,
it certainly may be argued with force that the fraud proved
mon sense of justice, and would profane the very marriage relation
itself. She was, it is true, culpably imprudent and indiscreet but she
was only a child, and therefore peculiarly an object of the solicitude
and protection of a court of chancery, and the appellee should not
be permitted by it to retain the profits of his fraud, which succeeded
only because of that very imprudence and want of discretion so often
associated with youth, upon which he relied."
21 Corder v. Corder, 117 Atl. 119 (Md. 1922).
See also Libman v. Libman, 102 Misc. 443; 169 N. Y. Supp. 900,
(1918); Crouch v. Wartenberg, 86 W. Va, 664; 140 S. E. 117, (1927);
Browning v. Browning, 89 Kansas 98; 130 Pae. 852, (1913); O'ConneZ
v. O'Connell, 201 Appellate Division, 338, 194 N. Y. Supp. 265, (1922).
" 91 N. J. Eq. 189 (1920), 110 Atl. 31.
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in the present case did not relate to an 'essential' element of
the petitioner's marriage. Possibly, if the phrase under con-
sideration is retained, the 'common law essentials' of a consum-
mated marriage may be defined within narrower limits than the
'common law essentials' of an unconsummated marriage.
"For all present purpose I think it is enough to find, as
I do, that the evidence in this case exhibits (1) a 'sufficient
fraud' to warrant the annulment of (2) an unconsummated
marriage, and that (3) such annulment, under the circum-
stances, will not be 'against sound considerations of public
policy.' "29
In Dooley v. Dooley', the doctrine of Ysern v. Sorter was
followed in the granting of a decree for fraud consisting of
false representations to a young woman twenty-two years old,
that the defendant was a Captain in the United States Army,
came of a family of wealth and prominence, was a physician,
and of good character. In fact he had been a corporal in the
army, a deserter, had been tried by a court-martial and sentenced
to imprisonment, and was a forger and a social outcast, living
on his wits. The fraud was discovered on the day of the wed-
ding and the marriage was immediately repudiated.
In Woodward v. Heickhelbecl', a decree was denied although
the marriage was unconsunmated, it appearing that the peti-
tioner was a matured business woman, and that the false repre-
sentations related to the defendant's financial worth.
CONCLUSION
A consummated marriage which has resulted in the estab-
lishment of a marital relationship should be annulled only for
frauds which do not permit the existence of a union marked by
the presence of the ability to procreate and the absence of any
19The factual situation was that petitioner was eighteen years old
at the time of the marriage and had recently left school; that she had
known defendant only two or three weeks; that he had represented
himself to be a person, of good moral character. After the ceremony
the parties went to a hotel in New York City where the defendant
began drinking heavily and proceeded to tell his wife of his immorali-
ties with women, stating that he had seduced other girls. Petitioner
thereupon returned to her mother's home having refused to permit the
consummation of the marriage by intercourse.
'o93 N. J. E. 22 (1921).
97 N. J. E. 252 (1925).
NULLITY Op MARRiAGE
condition which would permanently destroy that ability either
directly or by some indirect chain of causation necessitating for
grave reasons a separation of husband and wife. This does not
have the effect of making it possible to secure a decree for that
which is not essential to marriage. The requirement that the
fraud reached the essence of the relationship is retained. The
conception of what is'of the essence is broadened.
It would be foolhardy to do otherwise. The doctrine which
grants decrees only for frauds which go to the essence is rooted
in human nature and in our political institutions. It may be
likened to a pebble found upon the sands, fashioned after a law
of nature and in the exact form that best resists pressure. The
rough fragment of rock which fell from an overhanging cliff into
the sea to be taken possession of by the undercurrent and
dragged from ocean to ocean until deposited as a pebble on the
shore, presents an apt illustration of the creation of the doctrine
of esse talia. It is far more logical and practicable to leave it
open to the courts, by an enlightened application of the dictates
of modern times, to give to the term "essential of marriage"
that breadth of meaning which it rightly deserves.
"Where the marriage is unconsummated and no status has
been established, it would seem proper to adopt a rule that for
frauds which strike at matters substantially important to the
well being of the parties and a union of mutual productiveness, a
decree should be granted. Mutual productiveness must embrace
something more than the propagation of issue. Frustration of
that particular object of marriage is not the sole type of un-
productiveness which can make a union a nullity in results.
Just what the term should embrace should be left to the deter-
mination of the courts, unhampered by the restraints of fixed and
unyielding arbitrary limitations, and of doctrines solely applica-
ble to an established marital relationship.
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